The commentator raises two points, the first considered to be major, and the second minor:
(1) The claim in our article that electrode size and polarity change of pulses made no difference in the UTD and that there was little intrasubject variability in determining the UTDs are not substantiated by the original 1964 article in which the delay in consciousness for a stimulus was reported. Therefore, any relationship found between individual UTDs and repressiveness has to be called into question.
(2) What accounts for the delay in publication?
In point of fact, the UTDs of the subjects reported in our study were determined in [1973] [1974] and not in 1964. The variability for different subjects or different stimulus pulse frequencies reported in 1964 is irrelevant here. The UTD found for a given subject is valid for that subject. UTDs were found to be consistent for that subject when measured at different times although no tabulation was published. The poststimulus facilatatory state dissipated before the next trial 30 s later in all cases. The variation in liminal I with electrode size or polarity change is not relevant for the UTDs because the UTDs were approximately similar even though liminal I was changed. Moreover, the alternative hypotheses about UTDs given in the other three articles in this issue are addressed in the commentary by Libet and shown to be unwarranted.
It is important to emphasize, as mentioned above, that the UTDs were measured in 1973-1974 and thus the subjects tested in the present study were not among the early group of subjects whose results were reported in the 1964 article. The psychological testing of the subjects in the current study occurred between August 1981 and February 1982, approximately 7 years from the time the UTDs were determined in 1973-1974. The commentator incorrectly believes that the UTDs were measured in 1964 and that therefore the psychological testing had to be done in the 1970s. On the basis of this erroneous arithmetic, the commentator wonders why we waited 30 years to publish the results. In point of fact it took some 20 years. In the intervening years there were plans to collect new data to deal more specifically with emotionally meaningful stimuli that unfortunately did not materialize. We submit that the current finding stands on its own and constitutes a new contribution to our understanding of repression.
The concept of repression itself, which has been a matter of controversy over many years, appears to be gaining support in cognitive science and cognitive neuroscience. In a recent report in Nature, Anderson and Green (2001) describe a series of experiments in which they demonstrated the existence of suppression of unwanted memories by executive control. They demonstrated that the effect was due to an act of inhibition rather than to diversionary thoughts or a weakening of learned associative connections. Insofar as their stimuli were relatively innocuous and lacking in any personal anxiety-arousing significance, they concluded that repression can operate on nontraumatic material as well as on traumatic material. In this respect it is similar to our finding that also deals with nontraumatic stimuli. In our case a necessary condition for repression is identified-the greater the individual delay to becoming conscious of a stimulus, the more likely that that individual will develop repression as a defense. In the Anderson and Green research the mechanism of suppression itself is identified that can then be put to use for more personal reasons. As Conway (2001) observes in an accompanying commentary, ''Anderson and Green have now shown that, even in the innocuous setting of the laboratory, and with stimuli as trivial as randomly paired words, powerful inhibition can be evoked. How much stronger must this inhibition be for objects central to our thoughts and emotions'' (p.319).
It is of further interest that some years ago a psychoanalyst, Brenner (1976) , advanced the theory that basic cognitive processes such as memory, perception, and judgment are necessary conditions for the development of specific defenses. What makes the difference, he proposed, is the motivation or need, not the means. Delay to consciousness is one of those basic cognitive processes.
